Doxastic Involuntarism
Installment 1: Introduction
By Zack Lam
Introduction
Voluntary beliefs are the basis for doxastic voluntarism, the contentious notion that individuals can elect their beliefs. Within this doctrine there are two specific forms of voluntarism: direct doxastic voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism.(1)
Indirect doxastic voluntarism asserts that some beliefs are under our indirect control in the form of intermediate actions. There is virtually no debate over its existence, and the reason for this consensus is intuitive.(2) For example, one could believe that whales are mammals by voluntarily reading an encyclopedia and confirming that it is so. In addition, disproving a concept that presumes the voluntary nature of actions requires the refutation of free will as a whole, a venture outside the scope of this essay.
Rather, this essay will debate direct doxastic voluntarism, the view that individuals can freely and immediately believe any proposition through thought alone, without external influence.(3)
Prior to further discussing this issue, I must answer two definitional questions:
What are beliefs?
What are the conditions for direct doxastic voluntarism?
First, belief is a “propositional attitude,” a widespread definition with which most contemporary philosophers agree. Consider, for instance, the proposition, “it is raining.” One could respond with an attitude of joy or displeasure, or merely be convinced of the proposition’s truthfulness.(4) Following this structure, because attitudes are sincere, then beliefs, too, must be.
Second, a voluntary belief must meet two conditions:
The belief is absent of predispositions that establish bias for one belief over all others.
The individual must solely form and acquire the belief consciously.
The first condition is necessary because voluntary belief requires the individual to devalue their current beliefs. People value their beliefs which is why they act upon them,(5) and thus, I argue that doing the opposite of what that belief advises, intentionally accepting a contradictory belief, is impossible unless the previous belief carries little weight. The only situation in which one could voluntarily make a choice is under a tabula rasa. Any overriding preference for a specific belief predetermines the result of the choice, making it unquestionably involuntary. This is evident in a voter who prefers the candidate that aligns with their values. They match each candidate against a pre-formed criterion rather than evaluating them equally; bias and external influence guide the belief rather than free, untethered judgment.
The second condition is significant because any voluntary decision between distinct beliefs requires an individual to be aware of their options. Furthermore, any unconscious acquisition of belief would likely take into account previous attitudes, which violates the first condition.(6)
In his famous Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume argues that, “We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe, that such an animal has ever really existed.”(7) Drawing a clear line between conception and belief, Hume suggests that doxastic “free will” is not so free after all, confined by the limits of experience. The adoption of beliefs based on predetermined biases paints a mirage of voluntarism. In reality, beliefs are slanted conclusions drawn solely from the requisite judgment that limits our perception of the world. A theoretical choice exists, but the belief that is chosen is preset.
I contend that belief is involuntary; the two conditions of direct doxastic voluntarism are impossible to fulfill.
Endnotes:
Vitz, Rico. “Doxastic Voluntarism.” IEP, n.d. https://iep.utm.edu/doxastic-voluntarism/.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. “Belief.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#WhatItBeli.
Sathyanarayana Rao, TS, MR Asha, KS Jagannatha Rao, and P Vasudevaraju. “The Biochemistry of Belief.” Indian Journal of Psychiatry 51, no. 4 (2009), pp. 239–41. https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5545.58285.
Sperber, Dan. “Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.” Mind & Language 12, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 67–83. http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/1997_intuitive-and-reflective-beliefs.pdf.
Hume, David. “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” (1748), pp. 34–35 https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/enquiry.pdf.
